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tioner what, in counsel's honest opinion, would be the result
of presenting such claimed defense and petitioner, fully advised in the premises, accepted counsel's opinion and determined to plead guilty.
In the circumstances, counsel's representation of petitioner
was not" pro forma" rather than zealous and active, and such
representation did not deprive petitioner of the right to the
effective aid of counsel in any sense cognizable on habeas
corpus; rather, it is our opinion that even if the rec:ord now
before us (which, of course, indudes matters which were not
before the District Court of Appeal in People v. Atchley
(1955), s1tpra, 132 Cal.App.2d 444) were here on appeal, it
would not impel the conclusion that there was any reversible
error. (Gf. People v. Avile.z (1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 289, 296297 [194 P.2d 829]; People v. Jrfanchetti (1946), 29 Cal.2d
452,458-459 [175 P.2d 533) .)
For the reasons above stated, the order to show cause is
discharged and the petition is denied.
Shenk, J., Carter J., Traynor, ,J., Spence, J., and McComb,
J., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment.
Petitioner's application for a reheari11g \Yas deuiecll\Iay 22,
1957.

[L.A. No. 23847.

In Bank.

Apr. 24, 1967.]

FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF' LOS ANGELES (a
Corporation), Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents.
[1] Taxation-Nature: Duty to Pay.~ Payment of taxes has been
and is a uniform if not universal demand of government, and
there is an obligation on the part of the owner of property
to pay a tax legally assessed.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, ~s 1, 234; [2, 3, 19, 25, 26]
Taxation, § 67; [ 4-6, 8 J Taxation, § 77; [7] Constitutional Law
§ 15; [9, 11] Taxation,§ 115; [10] Taxation, §§ 28;), 287; [12, 15,
17, 22] Taxation, § 69; [13] Constitutional Law, § 163; [14]
Taxation, § 43; [16] Constitutional r~aw, § 1:55; [18, 20] Constitutional Law, § 115; [21] Taxation, §§ 67, 69; [23, 24] Constitutional Law, § 116.

420

FIRsT UNITARIAN CHURCH v.

Cou~"TY OF

L.A.

[48 C.2d

[2]] Id.-Exemptions.-An exemption from taxation is tlw exception and the unusual, and to provide for it under the laws of
this state requires constitutional or constitutionally authorized
statutory authority.
[3] Id.-Exemptions.-An exemption from taxation is a bounty or
gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted
may be withdrawn; it may be granted with or without conditions but where reasonable conditions are imposed they must
be complied with.
[ 4] !d.-Exemptions-Church Organizations.-A church organization is in no different position initially than any other owner
of property with reference to its obligations to assist in the
support of government by the payment of taxes, though such
organizations, throughout the history of the state, have been
made special beneficiaries by way of exemptions.
[5] !d.-Exemptions-Church Property.-Const., art. XX, § 19,
prohibiting tax exemptions for subversive persons and groups,
is a valid enactment under state law and is applicable to the
church property exemption provided for in art. XIII, § llfz;
its provisions that no person or organization included in the
proscribed class shall receive an exemption from taxation
apply to all tax exemption claimants, and its prohibitions are
declared by its own terms and are mandatory and prohibitory.
( Const., art. I, § 22.)
[6] !d.-Exemptions-Church Organizations.-The primary purpose of Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for
subversive persons and groups, was to provide for protection
of the revenues of the state against impairment by those who
would seek to destroy it by unlawful means; it contains no
exceptions, and applies to churches.
[7] Constitutional Law- Self-executing Provisions.- N otwithstanding that a particular constitutional provision may be selfexecuting, legislation enacted in aid thereof is not invalid.
[8] Taxation- Exemptions- Church Organizations.- Assuming
that Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty
on claiming exemption from property tax, is invalid, still
a church, under the general provisions of state law, is not
relieved from its obligation otherwise to disclose the facts
required by § 32.
[9a, 9b] Id.-Assessors-Duties.-Under the tax laws of the state,
wholly apart from Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption from property tax,
it is the duty of an assessor to see that all property within
[2] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 71; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 495.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 88; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 615.
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his jurisdiction is legally assessed and that exemptions are
not improperly allowed, and it is the duty of a property
owner to cooperate with the assessor and assist him in ascertainment of the facts with reference to taxability or exemption
by declarations under oath. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 254, 441,
452, 454, 461-463, 1361.)
(10] !d.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Recovery of Taxes Paid-Pleading and Proof.--If an assessor is satisfied from his investigations that an exemption from property tax should not be
allowed he may assess the property as not exempt and if contested compel a determination of the facts in a suit to recover
the tax paid under protest, in which case it would be necessary
for the claimant to allege and prove facts with reference to
the nature, extent and character of the property which would
justify the exemption and compliance with all valid regulations
in the presentation and prosecution of the claim.
[11] Id.-Assessors-Duties.-The presumption of innocence available to all in criminal prosecutions does not relieve or prevent
an assessor from making the investigation enjoined on him by
law to see that exemptions from property taxation are not improperly allowed; his administrative determination is not binding on the tax exemption claimant, but it is sufficient to
authorize him to tax the property as nonexempt and place the
burden on the claimant to test the validity of the administrative determination in an action at law.
[12] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming an exemption from
property tax, implements Const., art. XX, § 19, relating to subversive persons and groups, and provides a direct, time-saving
and relatively inexpensive method of ascertaining the facts;
the Legislature could take these factors into consideration and
also take into account the fact that the segment of householders, which are exempt from the requirements of the code
section, is so overwhelmingly large as compared with others
chosen for exemptions that the cost of processing them would
justify their separate classification.
[13] Constitutional Law- Classification- Presumptions.-Where
any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which would
sustain legislative classification the existence of those facts
will be presumed.
[14] Taxation-Subjects-Personal Property.-Under Const., art.
XIII, § 14, authorizing the Legislature to classify all kinds of
personal property for taxation, it may classify the personal
property of householders.
[15] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32,
requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption from
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property tax, is not invalid because of failure of the Legislature to include within its requirements those who are entitled
to exemptions under income tax laws and other tax laws
wherein certain exemptions are taken into consideration in
arriving at the amount of tax to be paid; those taxes are in
categories which are subject to different treatment by separate
classification.
[16] Constitutional Law-Classification-Failure to Cover Entire
Field.-The Legislature is at liberty to select one phase of a
problem for appropriate action without the necessity of including all others which might be affected in the same field of
legislation.
[17] Taxation-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption
from property tax, applies to all exemption claimants to which
it relates and supplies appropriate means for carrying out
the purposes of Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for subversive persons and groups.
[18] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Freedom.-U.S. Const., 1st Amendment, reflects the philosophy that
church and state should be separate, but it embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to 11ct; the first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be;
conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society.
[19] Taxation-Exemptions-Limitations.-The limitation imposed
by Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for subversive persons and groups, as a condition of exemption from
taxation is not a limitation on mere belief but a limitation on
action-the advocacy of certain proscribed conduct; what
one may merely believe is not prohibited; it is only advocates
of the subversive doctrine who are affected, since advocacy constitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief
or opinion.
[20] Constitutional Law- Fundamental Rights- Religious Freedom.-The exercise of religious activity is subject to some limitation if that exercise is deemed detrimental to society.
[21] Taxation-Exemptions-Limitations: Loyalty Oath.-There is
nothing in Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for
subversive persons and groups, or in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32,
requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption from
property tax, which interferes with the exercise of religion; a
church refusing to make such declaration is affected not
[18] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 200, 201; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 312.
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because it is a religious organization but because it is a taxpayer favored in law by an exemption for which it has refused
to qualify.
[22a, 22b] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 32, requiring the making of an oath of loyalty as a prerequisite to the granting of a property tax exemption to a church,
does not impose an unconstitutional limitation on the exercise
of religion; this oath is not a test of religious opinion and a
church is not excused from making it any more than any other
taxpayer.
[23] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Freedom of Expression.-Despite tl1e fact that U.S. Const., 1st Amendment, is
cast in terms of the absolute, it is not to be applied literally;
there is no absolute right of free speech or unqualified liberty
to speak.
[24a, 24b] !d.-Fundamental Rights-Freedom of Expression.-In
applying the phrase "clear and present danger" with reference
to the right to free speech, the courts in each case must ask
whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger.
[25] Taxation-Exemptions-Purpose.-One of the interests with
which the state is concerned and which it is attempting to
promote by granting exemptions from taxation is that of maintaining the loyalty of its people and thus safeguarding against
its violent overthrow by internal or external forces.
[26] Id.-Exemptions-Limitations.-The limitation on freedom of
speech imposed by Const., art. XX,§ 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for subversive persons and groups, is a conditional one,
imposed only if a tax exemption is sought; the prohibited
advocacy is penal in nature, and not one of the fundamental
guarantees but only a privilege or bounty of the state is withheld if the exemption claimant prefers to engage in the prohibited criminal advocacy; hence the infringement of free
speech imposed by such constitutional provision cannot be
deemed substantial.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Bayard Rhone, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover taxes paid under protest and for declaratory relief. Judgment for defendants on order sustaining
general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend,
affirmed.
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William R. Murrish, George T. Altman and Robert L. Brock
for Appellant.
Charles E. Beardsley and Stanley A. Weigel as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gordon Boller, Assistant County Counsel, and Alfred C. DeFlon, Deputy County
Counsel for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the
defendants following an order sustaining a general demurrer
to the complaint without leave to amend.
The action was brought to recover taxes paid under protest
and for declaratory relief. 'fhe plaintiff is a duly organized
nonprofit religious organization with its principal office in
the city of Los Angeles. It is the owner of real property
devoted exclusively to religious purposes and located within
the jurisdiction of, and subject to property taxation by, the
county and city of Los Angeles. It presented to the assessor
of Los Angeles County an application for the exemption of its
property, particularly described, for the fiscal year 1954-1955.
The application was denied by the assessor on the ground that
the plaintiff had not qualified for an exemption because it
had failed and refused to include in the application for exemption the nonsubversive declarations required by section
32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The application was
otherwise complete. Thereafter the real property of the plaintiff was assessed as property not exempt, and within the time
prescribed by law the plaintiff paid the tax under protest and
brought this action for the recovery of the sum so paid. The
assessor refused to allow the exemption because of the provisions of section 19 of article XX of the Constitution 1 and
section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 2
Section 19 of article XX was adopted at the general election
on November 4, 1952, and was placed as a new section in
that article under the heading ''Miscellaneous Subjects.''
The section reads :
"Section 19. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution, no person or organization which advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States or the
1

Hereinafter referred to as section 19 of article XX.
This and all other code sections hereinafter referred to will be to sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
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------------------------State by force or violence or other unlawful means or who
advocates the support of a foreign government against the
United States in the event of hostilities shall:
'' (a) Hold any office or employment under this State, including but not limited to the University of California, or
with any county, city or county, city, district, political subdivision, authority, board, bureau, commission or other public
agency of this State; or
"(b) Receive any exemption from any tax imposed by this
State or any county, city or county, city, district, political
subdivision, authority, board, bureau, commission or other
public agency of this state.
''The Legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary
to enforce the provisions of this section.'' ( Stats. 1953.)
Following the amendment to the Constitution section 32
was added to the Revenue and Taxation Code in 1953. It is as
follows:
''Any statement, return, or other document in which is
claimed any exemption, other than the householder's exemption, from any property tax imposed by this State or any
county, city or county, city, district, political subdivision,
authority, board, bureau, commission or other public agency
of this State shall contain a declaration that the person or
organization making the statement, return, or other document
does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States or of the State of California by force or violence
or other unlawful means nor advocate the support of a foreign
government against the United States in event of hostilities.
I£ any such statement, return, or other document does not
contain such a declaration, the person or organization making such statement, return, or other document shall not receive any exemption from the tax to which the statement, return, or other document pertains. Any person or organization who makes such declaration knowing it to be false is
guilty of a felony. This section shall be construed so as to
effectuate the purpose of Section 19 of Article XX of the
Constitution." ( Stats. 1953, p. 3114.)
The plaintiff contends that both the constitutional provision
and the code section are invalid. It is argued that the imposition and collection of taxes sought to be recovered and the
denial of the church property tax exemption provided for
in section 1% of article XIII of the Constitution, as applied
to the plaintiff church and all other churches similarly
situated, was and is in violation of the provisions of the
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state and federal Constitutions which require reasonable and
proper classifications for purposes of taxation and provide
for freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the protection
of other rights specified in the protest a copy of which is attached to and made a part of the complaint. The provisions
of the protest will be referred to later on in this opinion.
It is noted that section 19 of article XX does not specifically
mention churches or any other organizations or individuals
which are subject to its provisions. Its terms are general
and apply to all owners of property as to which exemption
from taxation might be claimed.
[1] It is fundamental that the payment of taxes has
been and is a uniform if not a universal demand of government, and that there is an obligation on the part of the owner
of property to pay a tax legally assessed. [2] An exemption
from taxation is the exception and the unusual. To provide
for it under the laws of this state requires constitutional or
constitutionally authorized statutory authority. [3] It is a
bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when
once granted may be withdrawn. It may be granted with or
without conditions but where reasonable conditions are imposed they must be complied with.
[4] A church organization is in no different position initially than any other owner of property with reference to
its obligations to assist in the support of government by the
payment of taxes. Church organizations, however, throughout the history of the state, have been made special beneficiaries by way of exemptions. A brief reference to the
constitutional and statutory background relating to this and
other exemptions in this state will be made.
We find in the Constitution of 1849 the following provisions: '' 'l'axation shall be equal and uniform throughout
thr state. All property in this state shall be taxed in proportion
to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law . . . . " (Laws
of California, 1850-1853, p. 57, art. XI, § 13.) No provision
for exemption from taxation is found in that Constitution.
In 1853 the Legislature passed an act entitled "AN AcT to
pmvide Reverwe for the Support of the Government of this
State.'' (Laws of California, 1850-1853, p. 669.) In section
1 of article I it was provided that all land in the state owned
or claimed by any person or corporation shall be listed for
taxation. In section 2 of the same article it was provided
that' "l'he following property shall not be listed for taxation."
Thc>n follow sevrral paragraphs where numerous elassifiea-
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tions of property are named, such as publicly owned property, town halls, public squares, colleges, schoolhouses, public
hospitals, asylums, poorhom:rs, ermetrries and grayeyarcls.
In paragraph 5 it was provided that the following also shall
not be listed for taxation: ''Churches, chapels, and other buildings for religious worship, with their furniture and equipments, and the lots of ground appurtenant thereto and used
therewith, so long as the same shall be used for that purpose
only." (Laws of California, 1850-1853, p. 671.)
This statutory method of providing for exemptions continued until the adoption of the Constitution of 1879. Section 1 of article XIII of the new Constitution required constitutional authority for exemptions. It was there provided
that "All property in this State except as otherwise in this
Constitution provided, . . . shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. . . . " In subsequent sections of the same article the exemption of numerous
classes of particularly described property is provided for.
Section llj2 of article XIII provides for the church exemption as follows: ''All buildings, and so much of the real property on which they are situated as may be required for the
convenient use and occupation of said buildings, when the
same are used solely and exclusively for religious worship
. . . shall be free from taxation . . . . "
In 1944 section 1c was added to article XIII which provides that "In addition to such exemptions as are now provided in this Constitution, the Legislature may exempt from
taxation all or any portion of property used exclusively for
religious, hospital or charitable purposes . . . " This provision did not have the effect of changing existing laws with
reference to the exemption of church property excrpt to
authorize the Legislature to extend the exemption of that
property as provided for in section 11/2 of articlr XIII to its
personal property. Whether that section is self-executing is
of no concern for in 1903 the Legislature added section 3611
to the Political Code, repeating the constitutional language
which exempted church real property and providing among
other things that ''any person claiming property to be exempt from taxation under this section shall make a return
thereof to the assessor annually, the same as property is listed
for taxation, and shall accompany the same by an affidavit
showing that the building is used solely and exclusively for
religious worship, and that the described portion of the real
property claimed as exempt is required for the convenient
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use and occupation of such building . . . . " ( Stats. 1903,
p. 21.) 'l'he reference in that section to property which "is
Jisted for taxation" was in contemplation of section 8, article
XIII of the Constitution, ·which has provided since 1879
that ''The Legislature shall by law require each taxpayer
in this State to make and deliver to the county assessor, annually, a statement, under oath, setting forth specifically all
the real and personal property owned by such taxpayer, or
in his possession, or under his control, at 12 o'clock meridian,
on the first Monday of March.''
Section 3611 of the Political Code was carried into the
ReYenue and Taxation Code in 1939 as section 254, which
provides that any "person claiming the church . . . exemption shall make a return of the property to the assessor annually, the same as property is listed for taxation, and shall
acrompany it by an affidaYit, giving any information required
by the'' State Board of EqualizaHon. The form prescribed
by the State Board of Equalization includes the nonsubversive
portion of the affidavit, which the plaintiff has refused to include in its return.
[5] No meritorious argument has been or can be adYanced to the effect that section 19 of article XX is not a valid
enactment under state law or that it is inapplicable to the
rhnrch pro[1erty exemption provided for in section 11/z of
article XIII. Section 19 of article XX was adopted in accordance with the procedurrs rrquired by the Constitution
for an amendment to that document by vote of the electors
of this state. Its provisions are plain and unambiguous and
require no interpretation in the matter of their prohibitions.
In dirert terms it proYinrs that no pen~on or organization
includrd in the proscribed class shall receive an exemption
from any tax imposed by the state or any taxing agency of
the state. It applies to all tax exemption claimants. Its
prohibitions arc derlared by its own terms and are mandatory and prohibitory. ( Const., art. I, § 22.)
By its enactment the people of the state declared the public policy of
·withholding from the owners of property in this state who
engage in the prohibited activities the benefits of tax exemption. The clenonncen activities are criminal offenses under
state law (Stats. 1919, p. 281), and the act of Congress known
as the Smith Act (54 Stat. 670) makes it unlawful to advoratP the overthrow of the government by force and violence.
[6] It may properly be said that the primary purpose of
the people of the state in the enactment of section 19 of
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article XX was to provide for the protection of the revenues
of the state from impairment by those who would seek to destroy it by unlawful means. It contains no exceptions. It
applies to churches when it provides that "Notwithstanding
any other provisions of this Constitution'' its prohibitions
shall apply to all tax exemption claimants, and declares in
effect that the tax revenues of the state shall not be depleted
by those who would seek to destroy it in violation of the
criminal laws of the state and the nation. It is clear that
section 19 of article XX is a valid enactment under the Constitution of the state. That it was properly incorporated in
the Constitution as a matter of state policy may not be questioned.
It is then to consider whether section 32 is a valid implementation of section 19 of article XX. Section 32 declares
that ''This section shall be construed so as to effectuate the
purpose of Section 19 of article XX of the Constitution.''
[7] Notwithstanding the fact that a particular provision may
be self-executing, legislation enacted in aid thereof is not
invalid. (Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal.2d 460, 463 [101 P.2d
1106 J.) The code section declares within itself its purpose
but that purpose is obvious without the declaration.
The plaintiff contends that section 32 is void for several
reasons. First, because of the exception from its requirements of householders who are entitled to an exemption of
$100 of assessed value of their personal property as provided
for in section 101;2 of article XIII of the Constitution. It
is contended that this exception renders the section lacking
in uniformity and thus provides for an unlawful classification
of taxable property under the law. Secondly, that it violates
the federal constitutional guarantees of separation of church
and state and freedom of speech. The first contention will be
considered in advance of the others for the reason that it involves the application of the Constitution and laws of the
state relating to taxation.
[8] If it be assumed for the moment that section 32 is invalid for any of the reasons stated, still the plaintiff, under
the general provisions of state law, is not relieved from its
obligation otl1erwise to disclose the facts required by section
32. In this connection the powers and duties of the assessor
and the obligations of the plaintiff as the owner of real and
personal property must be considered in the light of state law.
Those powers, duties and obligations are set forth generally
in the Revenue and Taxation Code.
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[9a] It is the duty of the assessor to see that all property
within his jurisdiction is legally assessed and that exemptions are not improperly allowed. He is liable on his bond
''for all taxes on property which is unassessed through his
wilful failure or neglect.'' ( § 1361.) By section 441 it is
provided in accordance with section 8 of article XIII of the
Constitution that ''Every person shall file a written property
statement, under oath, with the assessor between noon on the
first Monday in March and 5 p. m. on the last Monday in
May, annually, and within such time as the assessor may
appoint. At any time, as required by the assessor for assessment purposes, every person shall furnish information or
records for examination.'' For use by the assessor and the
property owner the State Board of Equalization is required
to prepare the forms of blanks for the property statement.
( § 452.) 'fhe assessor may subpoena and examine any person in relation to any statement furnished by him. ( § 454.)
Any person who wilfully states to the assessor anything which
he knows to be false, in any oral or written statement, even not
under oath, but required or authorized to be made and relating to an assessment, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (§ 461.)
Section 462 provides that every person is guilty of a misdemeanor ·who, after proper demand by the assessor, refuses
to give the assessor a list of his taxable property or ''Refuses
to s·wear to the list.'' By section 463 it is provided, among
other things, that every person shall forfeit $100 to the people
of the state, to be recovered by action brought in their name
by the assessor, for each refusal to furnish the property statement or to fail to appear and testify when requested to do so
by the assessor.
It thus appears that under the tax laws of the state wholly
apart from section 32 it is the duty of the assessor to ascertain the facts with reference to the taxability or exemption
from taxation of property within his jurisdiction. And it is
also the duty of the property owner to cooperate with the
assessor anc1 assist him in the ascertainment of these facts by
declarations under oath.
vVith particular reference to the many and various tax
exemptions, the Revenue and Taxation Code provides for the
ascertainment of the facts as a prerequisite for exemptions.
Those facts in many instances must be made known to the
assessor by the affidavit of the tax exemption claimant. They
include, among others, veterans exemptions, church exemptions, welfare exemptions, college exemptions and orphanage
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exemptions. In the case of the church exemption the affidavit
shall give "any information required" to carry the exemption
into effect. ( § 254.) It is significant to note that nowhere in
the law of the state is there a requirement for the property
owner to make a showing for tax exemptions in the case of
householders, cemeteries, game refuges and a few others. It
thus appears that the Legislature in addition to the exception
of householders from the requirements of section 32 has made
no requirement otherwise for any showing on their part of
their right to the exemption, either by affidavit or otherwise.
If the exclusion of householders from the requirement of
section 32 renders that section void as discriminatory or lacking in uniformity it would seem to follow that the entire
Revenue and Taxation Code with reference to procedures to
qualify for exemptions would be void for the same reason.
But obviously no such claim is made.
As stated it is the duty of the assessor to see that exemptions are not allowed contrary to law and this of course includes those which are contrary to the prohibitions provided
for in section 19 of article XX. With the aid of section 32
his task is facilitated by the means therein supplied. Without that aid he is nevertheless required to ascertain the facts
with reference to tax exemption claimants. Those facts may
be disclosed in several different ways. In the instances in
which he is without the assistance or cooperation of the tax
exemption claimant and he is relegated to his own devices
in discovering the facts he may do so by the examination
under oath of the exemption claimant. ( § 454.) [10] If he
is satisfied from his investigations that the exemption should
not be allowed he may assess the property as not exempt and
if contested compel a determination of the facts in a suit to
recover the tax paid under protest. In such a case it would
be necessary for the claimant to allege and prove facts with
reference to the nature, extent and character of the property
which would justify the exemption and compliance with all
valid reg-nlations in the presentation and prosecution of the
claim. [9b] In any event it is the duty of the assessor to
ascertain the facts from any legal source available. In performing this task he is engaged in the assembly of facts
which are to serve as a guide in arriving at his conclusion
whether an exemption should or should not be allowed. That
Ponclnsion is in no wise a final determination that the claimant brlongs to a class proscribed by section 19 of article XX
or is guilty of any activity there denounced. [11] The pre-
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sumption of innocence available to all in criminal prosecutions
does not in a case such as this relieve or prevent the assessor
from making the investigation enjoined upon him by law to
see that exemptions are not improperly allowed. His administrative determination is not binding on the tax exemption claimant but it is sufficient to authorize him to tax the
property as nonexempt and to place the burden on the claimant to test the validity of his administrative determination
in an action at law. ]'or the obvious purpose, among others,
of avoi,ling litigation, the Legislature, throughout the years
has sought to relieve the assessor of the burden, on his own
illitiatiYr and at the public expense, of ascertaining the facts
with reference to tax exemption claimants. [12] In addition
to the means heretofore and otherwise provided by law the
Legislature, with special reference to the implementation of
section 19 of article XX, has enacted section 32. That section
proYides a direct, timesaving and relatively inexpensive
method of ascertaining the facts. The Legislature could take
these factors into consideration. It could also take into account the fact that the segment of householders in this state
is so overwhelmingly large as compared with others chosen
for exemptions that the cost of processing them would justify
their separate classification. [13] Where any state of facts
can be reasonably conceived which would sustain legislative
classification the existence of those facts will be presumed.
(Lelande v. Lowe1·JJ, 26 Cal.2d 224, 232-233 [157 P.2d 639,
175 A.L.R. 1109] .) [14] Furthermore, aside from the power
of the Legislature to classify for the purpose of general legislation (see Reclamation District v. Riley, 192 Cal. 147, 156
[218 P. 762] ; 24 CaLJur. 432) there is another and more
conclusive reason why it may classify the personal property
of householders. Section 14 of article XIII of the Constitution was amended in 1933 to provide that the Legislature
''shall have the power to IJrovide for the assessment, levy and
collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible personal property . . . may classify any and all kinds of personal property
for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner and
at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from any
other property in this State subject to taxation and may exempt entirely from taxation any or all forms, types or classes
of personal property." Of this constitutional provision this
court said in Roehm v. Connty of Oran(fe, 32 Cal.2d 280 at
11ages 283-284 [196 P.2c1 5501 : "Article XIII of the California
Constitution as first adopted provided for a uniform property
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tax upon real and personal property alike. This requirement
of uniform taxation of real and personal property, however,
has been abandoned by subsequent amendments. Under these
amendments the Legislature may classify personal property
for purposes of taxation or exempt all personal property or
any form, type, or class thereof,'' and on page 285 the court
declared that this authorization to the Legislature to classify
tangible personal property is ''all inclusive'' and covers ''all
forms" of tangible personal property. The personal property
of the householders falls within the kind of personal property
which the Legislature was constitutionally authorized to
classify for purposes of taxation.
There is therefore no merit in the plaintiff's contention that
the exception of householders from the requirements of section 32 renders that section invalid. [15] There is likewise
no merit in the contention that the section is invalid because
of the failure of the Legislature to include within its requirements those who are entitled to exemptions under income tax
laws and numerous other tax laws wherein certain exemptions
are taken into consideration in arriving at the amount of the
tax to be paid. Those taxes are in categories which are
subject to different treatment by separate classification.
[16] The Legislature is at liberty to select one phase of a
problem :for appropriate action without the necessity of including all others which might be affected in the same field
of legislation. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563], and cases
there cited.) [17] Section 32 applies to all exemption
claimants to which it relates and supplies appropriate means
for carrying out the purposes of section 19 of article XX.
The foregoing application of tax laws of the state is peculiarly a matter of state concern. ( Chanler v. Kelsey, 205
U.S. 466 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882] ; Orr v. Gilman, 183
U.S. 278 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed. 196]; 24 Cal.Jur. 434-435.)
We turn now to the question of the validity of the constitutional amendment and implementing legislation under guarantees of the federal Constitution. We approach this phase
of the case in the light of the fact that section 19 of article
XX prescribes no penal sanctions and in a governmental
sense may be deemed merely a declaration of state policy
with reference to its own tax structure. However, the plaintiff has taken the position that this constitutional provision
is in reality an unlawful limitation on its constitutional rights
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which are protected by the federal Constitution. This question is extensively argued on behalf of the plaintiff.
It is claimed that section 19 of article XX imposes an
unconstitutional condition on the right to a tax exemption
in that it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the federal Constitution which prohibit, among other things,
the making of any law ''respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . " (Sec
McColl11m v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 2ml, 210 [68
S.Ct. 461, 92 hEel. 649, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338] ; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352] .)
[18] Without the slightrst doubt the First Amendment
reflects the philosophy that (•burch and state should be kept
separate. (Zor-ach v. Clauson (1952), 343 U.S. 306, 312 [72
S.Ct. 679, 96 hEel. 9;54]; E'i·e1·son v. Boa1·d of Eclncation,
:330 U.S. 1, 59 [67 S.Ct. 504, 91 hEel. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392] .)
However, the First ''Amendment embraces two concepts,freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is an absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. . . . "
(Cantwell v. Connecticnt, S1lpm, 310 U.S.
296, 303-304; sre also Unit eel States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
86 [64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148] .) [19] In the present
case it is apparent that the limitation imposed by section 19
of article XX as a condition of exemption from taxation,
is not a limitation on mere belief but is a limitation on
action-the advocacy of certain proscribed conduct. ~What
one may merely believe is not prohibited. It is only advocates
of the subversive doctrines who are affected. Advocacy constitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief
or opmwn. (See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 [45 S.Ct.
625, 69 L.Ed. 1138] ; Leubuschcr v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 54 F'.2d 998, 999.)
IN e are concerned, then, not with the freedom to believe
but with the limited freedom to act. [20] The exercise of
religious activity has long been recognized as subject to some
limitation if that exercise is deemed detrimental to society.
In Reynolds v. Unitecl States, 98 U.S. 145 [25 L.Ed. 244],
the plaintiff was a church member and a conscientious practitioner of its established doctrine >Yhich encouraged polygamy.
The Supreme Court in holding that such religious activity
was subjeet to legislative limitations, stated at page 167 that
to permit exeeptions based on religions doe trine "would be
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior
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to the law of the land, and in effret to permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstances." (See also Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14 [67 S.Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12]; Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645] .)
'rhere are decisions ·wherein statutory provisions having some
effect on religious aetivity have been upheld on the ground
that their effect was only incidental. In Zorach v. Clauson
( 1952), supr-a, 343 U.S. 306, the Supreme Court sustained
the New York "released time" statutory provisions whereby
public schools were permitted to release children for religious
purposes during a part of the normal school day. Contentions were made to the effect that those provisions prohibited
the ''free exercise'' of religion or were ''respecting an establishment of religion'' within the meaning of the First Amendment. The court concluded at pages 312-313 that the First
Amendment ''studiously defines the manner, the specific ways,
in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency
one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other
-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could
not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities
would not be permitted to render police or fire protection
to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in
the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making 'rhanksgiving Day a holiday; 'so help me God' in our
courtroom oaths-these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our
ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. . . . We
would have to press the concept of separation of Church and
State to those extremes to condemn the present law on constitutional grounds."
[21] In the present case there is nothing in the new enactments, either constitutional or statutory, which interferes
with the free exercise of religion. The plaintiff is affected
not because it is a religious organization but because it is a
taxpayer favored in the law by an exemption for which it
has refused to qualify. The plaintiff has failed to point out
what tenet or doctrine of its faith is infringed upon by compelling it to qualify for the exemption. Those tenets and
doctrines are set forth in a document attached to the protest
of the payment of its taxes and is made a part of the com-
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plaint. It announces to the world the plaintiff's high principles and purposes. The prohibited activity cannot, with
any reason whatsoever, be consistent with or be tolerated by
the religious doctrines there published and subscribed to by
the plaintiff. As against a claim that such advocacy might
be included within religious teaching, the Supreme Court
has disposed of the contention. In JJ1urdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81],
the court stated at page 109 that "we do not intimate or
suggest . . . that any conduct can be made a religious rite
and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First
Amendment. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-167
[25 L.Ed. 244], and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 [10 S.Ct.
299, 33 L.Ed. 637] denied any such claim to the practice
of polygamy and bigamy. Other claims may well arise which
deserve the same fate." In Davis v. Beason, cited in the
Murdock case, the court said of the advocacy of plural marriages : ''To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to
offend the common sense of mankind . . . . The term 'religion'
has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being
and character, and of his obedience to His will. . . . It is
assumed by counsel of the petitioner, that because no mode
of worship can be established or religious tenets enforced
in this country, therefore any form of worship may be followed and any tenets, however destructive of society, may
be held and advocated, if asserted to be a part of the religious
doctrines of those advocating and practising them. But nothing is further from the truth . . . . It docs not follow that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. Crime
is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.'' As above noted the
advocacy of the conduct prohibited has been made criminal
by Congress (Smith Act, 54 Stat., part I, p. 670 [1940] ),
and through numerous statutory provisions by state legislatures it is well established that such advocacy is against
local public policy. (See Levering Act, Stats. 1951 [3d Ex.
Sess. 1950, ch. 7], p. 15.) In upholding the validity of the
Levering Act this court in Packman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d
676 [249 P .2d 267], stated that the oath required there and
similar in effect to the present one, was "ohYiously not a
test of religious opinion.''
[22a] It is further claimed by the plaintiff that section
32 imposes unconstitutional limitations upon the exercise of
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religion. As possibly affecting religion, section 32, in addition to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, requires
the making of an oath. Since this oath is ''obviously not a
test of religious opinion" the plaintiff is not excused from
making it any more than any other taxpayer. It appears that
an oath was subscribed on behalf of the plaintiff by one of
its officers when it filed its affidavit with the claim for exemption and its complaint in this action was also verified
on its behalf. If the making of the oath is objectionable to
the plaintiff it must be for reasons relating to the content of
the particular oath and not merely because it is an oath.
This contention, therefore, may not be sustained.
It is also claimed that section 19 of article XX is a restriction on freedom of speech. The phrase ''freedom of
speech" is helpful in bringing to mind the concept which it
means to convey, but as is often the case such a descriptive
phrase assumes a literal meaning which causes difficulty and
confusion in the development of the law surrounding it.
,Justice Holmes aptly stated that it "is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.''
(See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 [32 S.Ct.
793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, 1135] ; see also Corwin, Bowing Out
"Clear and Present Damger," 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 325.)
[23] Despite the fact that the First Amendment is cast
in terms of the absolute it is not to be applied literally.
There never has been an absolute right of free speech or
an unqualified liberty to speak. "Speech" in the broad
sense embodies all means of expression and communication.
It is the primary vehicle by which individuals and organizations converse and transmit ideas, information and knowledge, and is deserving of the highest degree of protection
and preservation. But there are other important interests
of society which, at times, may conflict with the interest of
individuals or groups in the exercise of this asserted freedom.
In such circumstances the courts must declare when the
individual or group does or does not have a right to speak
freely, depending on a balance of the individual's right to
speak out as against the harm or injury society may suffer
as a result of such speech. The courts have been called upon
to engage in this weighing process in many instances. Illustrative are those which protect society from a breach of the
peace (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 f62 S.Ct.
766, 86 L.Ed. 1031]), "loud and raucous" noises caused by

438

FIRST "GcsiTARIAN CHURCH v. CouNTY

Ol"

L. A.

[ 48 C.2d

sound trueks (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448,
93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608]), interruption of the free
flow of commerce (American Comnmnications Assn. v. Do1lds,
339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 67 4, 94 L.Ed. 925] ) and the like.
[24a] The standard by which the various interests have
been balanced has, until recently, been the so-called ''clear
and present danger" test. It was heretofore declared that
the right to free speech could be infringed upon only in situations where it appeared that the "words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils" sought to be repressed. (Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470] .) However, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857,
95 L.Ed. 1137], the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier
decisions in this field, reconsidered the test in the light of
existing and recognized realities and in conclusion stated:
"Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below,
interpreted the phrase as follows: 'In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger.' 183 F.2d at 212. "\Ve
adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief
,Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other
we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration
those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words.'' By that
statement of the test the standard by which a weighing of
interests is to be made is clearly indicated.
The interest of the state in protecting its revenue raising
program from subversive exploitation has already been considered. [25] There are additional interests with which the
state is concerned and which it is attempting to promote by
granting exemptions from taxation. Included is the interest
of the state in maintaining the loyalty of its people and thus
safeguarding against its violent overthrow by internal or
external forces. This legitimate objective is sought to be
accomplished by placing in a favored economic position, and
thus to promote their well being and sphere of influence, those
particular persons and groups of individuals who are capable
of formulating policies relating to good morals and respect
for the law. It has been said that when church properties
arp exrmpted from taxation ''it mnst be because. apart from
religious considerations, churches are regarded as institutions
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established to inculcate principles of sound morality, leading
eitizens to a more ready obedience to the laws." ( Cmmty of
Santa Clam v. Southern J>ac. R. Co., 18 P. 385, 400 [9 Sawy.
165]; 24 Cal.Jur. 105.) The same may be said of others
enjoying tax exemptions, notably veterans (art. XIII, § 1%;
Allied At·chiteets Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [221 P. 209,
30 A.L.R. 1029]; Vetemns' Welfare Boar·rl v. Riley, 188 Cal.
G07, 611 [206 P. 631]), colleges (art. XIII,§ 1a) and charitable
organizations (art. XIII, § 1e) whieh, together with church
groups, occupy positions whereby they may exert a salutary
influence on the moral well-being of the community. Encourag·ement to loyalty to our institutions and an incentive to
defend one's country in the event of hostilities are doctrines
which the state has plainly promulgated and intends to foster.
It is the high purpose residing in its people that the state
is attempting to encourage in its endeavor to protect itself
against subversive infiltration. The propriety of that objective is recognized by the Supreme Court in the Dennis case
(Dennis v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 494) where it said
at page 509: "Overthrow of the Government by force and
violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value
of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure
from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected."
Obviously, a program of tax exemption designed to promote
adherence to the principles of our government but constrained
to include within its bounty persons or organizations actively
advocating subversion and the support of enemies in time of
hostilities, would be wholly without reason and result in its
own defeat.
[24b] The test requires further that consideration be
given not only to the "gravity of the 'evil' " sought to be
repressed but that the evil be ''discounted by its improbability." The Dennis ease involved the validity of the Smith
Aet which prohibited and made criminal the advocacy of the
activities denounced by the people of this state in its Constitution. In speaking of the imminence of the threat posed
by the advocacy of subversive activities, the court at page
509 stated: "If Government is aware that a group aiming
at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members
and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required . . . . Certainly an attempt to overthrow
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the Government by force, ewn though doomed from the outset
because of inadequate numbers or povver of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.'' In that
case the court upheld an instruction to the jury that if the
defendants actively advocated governmental overthrow by
force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit,
then as a "matter of law . . . there is sufficient danger of
a substantive evil that the Congress has a right to prevent
to justify the application of the statute under the First
Amendment of the Constitution.'' In the present case the
constitutional provision is concerned with those who advocate
the same prohibited activity. It must be said that such advocacy from whatever source poses a threat to our government
and that the gravity of the evil is not to be materially discounted by its improbability within the meaning of the test
employed in the Dennis case.
[26] Against the fundamental interest sought to be safeguarded by the state it is necessary to consider and balance
the interest of those who assert that their right to speak has
been unduly limited. From what has heretofore been said
it is apparent that the limitation on speech is a conditional
one, imposed only if a tax exemption is sought; that the prohibited advocacy is penal in nature, and that not one of the
fundamental guarantees but only a privilege or bounty of
the state is withheld if the exemption claimant prefers to
engage in the prohibited criminal advocacy. It is obvious,
therefore, that by no standard can the infringement upon
freedom of speech imposed by section 19 of article XX be
deemed a substantial one.
[22b] Apart from considerations involving the constitutional amendment the additional requirement of an oath imposed by section 32, of and by itself, gives no cause for the
plaintiff to complain that it is improperly deprived of constitutional freedoms where compliance with the oath requirements otherwise may properly be imposed. (Chesney v.
Byram, supra, 15 Cal.2d 460, 465-468.)
Statutory limitations on the free exercise of speech similar
in nature to the present limitation have been imposed as
valid conditions upon which some privilege, benefit or conditional right has been withheld by a state. For example,
as a condition to obtaining or maintaining employment state
employees have been required to subscribe to oaths which
declare their nonaclvocacy of subversive activities (Packman
v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 676) ; as have county employees
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(Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 39 Cal.2d 698 [249
P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145] ; Steiner v. DMby, 88 Cal.App.2d
481 [199 P.2d 429]), municipal employees ( Garne1· v. Board
of Public Works of Los Anocles, 341 U.S. 716 [71 S.Ct. 909,
95 L.Ed. 1317], affirming Garner v. Board of Public W arks,
98 Cal. A pp.2d 493 [ 220 P .2d 958] ) , public school teachers
(Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 [72 S.Ct. 380,
96 hE d. 517, 27 A.L.R.2d 4 72] ; Steinmetz v. Caliform·a State
BoaTel of Edtwcdion, 44 Cal.2d 816 [285 P.2d 617]; Board
of Education v. Eiscnbcr[J, 129 Cal.App.2d 732 [277 P.2d
943]; Board of Education v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal.App.2d 100
[270 P.2d 82]), and candidates for public offices ( Gerende
v. Baltimore etc. Board of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [71 S.Ct.
565, 95 LEd. 745]; Shttb v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177 [76 A.2d
332]). 'l'he right to a bounty or other benefits from the state
has been so conditioned in the case of applicants for state
unemployment benrfits. (State v. Hamilton, 92 Ohio App.
285 [110 N.E.2d 37]; Dworken v. Collopy, (Ohio) 91 N.E.2d
564.) Even the right to vote ( Opin·ion of the Jttsfices, 252 Ala.
351 [40 So.2d 849] ), and to citizenship (United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 [49 S.Ct. 448,73 L.Ed. 889]) has
been so conditioned.
'l'he plaintiff contends that the constitutional amendment
and implementing legislation are invalid for other reasons
based on constitutional guarantees. Such contentions are
without merit in view of what has been said in disposing of
the basic contentions presented.
-<'Htention has been directed to the recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 [76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed.
640] (April 2, 1956), wherein the Supreme Court declared
invalid a Pennsylvania penal provision (Pa. Penal Code,
§ 207, 18 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., § 4207) which made it a
erime to advocate the violent overthrow of the federal or state
government. Reasons for the decision in that case were that
Congress had occupied the field to the exclusion of "parallel"
state legislation; that the dominant interest of the federal
government required that such "prosecutions" should be exclusively within the control of the federal government, and
that the "PennsylYania Statute presents a peculiar danger
of interferenee with the federal program." It is clear from
the opinion of the court in that case that the exclusion of
state sedition legislation was limited to the imposition of
criminal penalties. The court directed its attention to "antisedition statutes, criminal anarehy laws, criminal syndicalist
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laws, etc." No reference is made to the many so-called loyalty
oath cases considered by the court in recent years. The court's
intention not to ehange or modify the established law in those
cases by what it said in the Nelson ease appears from its
later opinion in Slochowe1· v. Board of Education, 350 U.S.
551 [76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692], deeided on April 9, 1956,
one week after the eourt 's deeision in the Nelson ease. In
speaking of balaneing the state's interest in the loyalty of
ecrtain persons against the interests of those persons in their
individuals rights, the eourt referred by way of illustration to
its earlier deeisions in Adler v. Board of Education, supra,
342 U.S. 485, and Garner v. Board of Public W arks of Los
Angeles, sup1·a, 341 U.S. 716, 720. In both of those eases
the eourt upheld the validity of state legislation whieh required, as a condition to acquiring or maintaining partieular
privileges or rights by certain persons, that sueh persons refrain from advoeating the violent overthrow of our form of
government. If in the present case the eonstitutional amrndment and implementing legislation infringe upon an area
oceupied exelusively by Congress within the scope of the
decision in the Nelson ease, eertainly the same eonelusion
would be true of the enaetments involved in the Garner and
Adler cases and the court would not have approved those
deeisions in the Sloehower case. Furthermore, in any consideration of the possible application of the Nelson case to
the ease at bar, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
the federal government intends to or has oecupied the field
of state taxation.
:F'inally, it should be observed that we are here dealing
with questions of law and not with any questions of faet with
referenee to the aetivities of the plaintiff organization. As
hereinbefore noted, there is attaehed to the protest filed with
the payment of the tax sought to be recovered a statement
of the prineiples and objeetives of the plaintiff in furtherance
of its religious aetivities. Those principles and doctrines
refleet the high ideals of morality and personal conduct whieh
are basic in the foundation of our system of government,
both state and national. They are noble in purpose and
inspirational in tone. It is inconceivable that an organization
aetuated by the doctrinal pronouncements there deelared
would knowingly harbor within itself any person or gronp of
persons who would engage in the subversive activities referred
to in seetion 19 of artiele XX. It is taken for granted that
an organization aetuated by those high purposes and ideals
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would be the first to champion the efforts of the state to
protect itself against the destruction of those guarantees
which are necessary to the existence of the plaintiff and to
the preservation of the fundamental rights which it otherwise
enjoys. But an assumed fact of the nonexistence of subversion in an organization is not enough. The law demands the
ascertainment of that fact for purposes of taxation and section 32 requires the cooperation of the plaintiff in establishing it.
No good reason has been advanced why churches as well
as all of the many other organizations seeking exemption
from taxation should not be required to comply with the law
of the state providing for assistance to the county assessors
in the discharge of their duties to ascertain the facts which
would justify the exemption. By the plaintiff's failure and
refusal to allege that it has complied with the law which
would enable it to qualify for the exemption the complaint
fails to state a cause of action. 'l'he demurrer was therefore
properly sustained without leave to amend.
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, ,J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Section 19 of article XX of the California Constitution and
section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code unjustifiably
restrict free speech. Section 19 in effect imposes a penalty in
the form of withholding a tax exemption upon any person
or organization that chooses to speak in a certain manner,
namely, by advocating overthrow of the federal or state governments by force or support of a foreign government against
the United States in event of hostilities. Section 32 provides
a special method of enforcing these restrictions as to certain
tax exemptions. A person claiming one of these exemptions
must make a declaration that he does not advocate the conduct specified in section 19. In effect the provisions impose a
tax measured by the exemptions allowed to others not only
upon those who advocate overthrow of the government by
force or support of a foreign government in event of hostilities, but also upon those who do not advocate such conduct
but refuse to declare that they do not.
A restraint on free speech is not less a restraint when it
is imposed indirectly through withholding a privilege rather
than directly through taxation, fine, or imprisonment. This
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court so held in Danskin v. San Diego Unifiecl Sch. Dist.,
28 Cal.2d 536, 547-548 [171 P.2d 885], involving a comparable privilege, the n:-:e of school buildings for public
meetings. "It is true that the state need not open the doors
of a school building as a forum and may at any time choose to
close them. Once it opens the doors, however, it eannot
demand tickets of admission in the form of convietions and
affiliations that it deems aeceptable . . . . 'l'hc Yery purpose
of a forum is the interchange of irleas, and that purpose eannot be frustrated by a eenson;hip that >vould label eertain convictions and affiliations suspeet, denying the pri\'ilPge of
assembly to those who hold them, but granting it to those
whose convictions and affiliations happen to be acceptable
and in effect amplifying their privilege by makiug it a special
one. In the competitive struggle of ideas for acceptam~e they
would have a great strategic advantage in making themselves
known and heard in a forum where the competition had been
diminished by censorship, and their very freedom would intensify the suppression of those condemned to silenee. It is
not for the state to control the influence of a pnblie forum
by censoring the ideas, the proponents, or the audiem~e; if it
could, that freedom which is the life of a democratic assembly
would be stilled. And the dulling rffects of censorship on
a community are more to be feared than the quickening influence of a live interchange of ideas.''
The tax exemptions in question are likewise comparable to
the privilege of using the mails at less than eost. In H annegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 [6G S.Ct. 4G6, 90 hEd.
586], the court declared that, "grave constitutional questions
are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails
is a privilege which may be extende(1 or withheld on any
grounds whatsoever . . . . Under that view the second-class
rate could be granted on condition that certain economic or
political ideas not be disseminated. 'l'hc provisions of the
[statute] . . . >vould have to be far more explicit for us to
assume that Congress made such a radical departure from our
traditions and undertook to clothe the PostmastPr General
with the power to supervise the tastes of the reading puhlic of
the country." The dissent of l\Ir. Justice Brandeis in Unit eel
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Dcmocratie Pnblishin.r; Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 4:30-431 [41 S.Ct. 352, 65 hEd. 704],
invoked in the Esquire case, rrasoned that, ''Congress may
not through its postal police power put limitations upon the
freedom of the press which if directly attempted would be
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unconstitutional. This court also stated in Ex parte Jackson
that 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the
publication would be of little valne.' It is argued that
although a newspaper is barred from the second-class mail,
liberty of circulation i;;; not dC>nied, because the first and thirdclass mail and also other means of transportation are left
open to a publislwr. Constitutional rights should not be
frittered a\Yay by argnments so tC>chnical and unsubstantial.
'The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its
inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name.' ( C11mmings
v. 1J1issonri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 325 [18 L.Ed. 356].) The
Government, might, of course, decline altogether to distribute
newspapers; or it might decline to carry any at less than the
cost of the service; and it would not thereby abridge the
freedom of the press, since to all papers other means of transportation would be left open. But to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service and to deny that
seryicc to one paper of the same general character, because
to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past
seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge
seriously freedom of expression.''
Although free speech may not be an absolute right, it must
be jealously guarded. As the court stated in American Commnnications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 [70 S.Ct. 674,
94 I1.Ed. 925], the first amendment "requires that one be
permitted to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil will result therefrom.'' That test is still a valid one. It was not repudiated
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95
hEel. 1137]. The court was there concerned not to abolish
the clear and present danger test bnt to bend it to the special
situation of a critical time and the diabolic strategy of the
Communist Party. As before, the key word in its solution
vms danger: " 'In each case [courts J must ask whether the
gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.' " (341 U.S. at 510.) There was evidence that the
i!efr.ndants, members of the Communist Party, advocated overthrow of the government by force and violence. The jury
vYas instructed that it could not find them guilty under thr
statute nnless it found that they had conspired with the intent
that their advocacy "be of a rule or principle of action and
by language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
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persons to such action, all with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction'' of the government by force. The jury
had also to determine whether the defendants intended to
overthrow the government ''as speedily as the circumstances
would permit." Moreover, the court of appeals held that the
record supported the conclusion that "the Communist Party
is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into
strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language; that the Party is rigidly controlled; that Communists,
unlike other political parties, tolerate no dissension from the
policy laid down by the guiding forces, but that the approved
program is slavishly followed by the members of the Party.
" (341 U.S. at 498, 511-512.)
It is essential in each case to inquire into the character of
the speech to be restrained and the surrounding circumstances.
The probability that advocacy will break out in action depends
on the numbers, methods, and organization of the advocates.
The state provisions in question penalize advocacy in a
totally different context from that in the Dennis case. The
penalty falls indiscriminately on all manner of advocacy,
whether it be a call to action or mere theoretical prophecy
that leaves the way open for counteradvocacy by others. Moreover, with regard to advocacy of support of a foreign government, the state provisions penalize not only advocacy during
actual hostilities but also advocacy during peacetime of action
during hostilities that may occur, if at all, in the remote
future.
There is no evidence in the present case that plaintiff church
or its members advocate the overthrow of the government by
force or otherwise. There is no evidence that plaintiff church
or any of the organizations seeking tax exemptions are infiltrated by Communists or other disloyal persons, or that they
are in any danger of such infiltration. The evidence is all
to the contrary. It is baldly assumed that plaintiff church
advocates the overthrow of the government by force because
it refuses to declare that it does not. It is one thing for a
court to sustain convictions after it has concluded following
a full trial that it is dealing with an organization wielding the
power of a centrally controlled international Communist movement; it is quite another to deprive a church of a tax exemption on the ground that it will not declare that it does not
advocate overthrow of the government.
If it is unconstitutional to restrain plaintiff from advocating overthrow of the government, it is a fortiori uneonstitu-
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tional to require it to prove or declare that it does not
advocate overthrow of the government. (See Dauskin v. San
Diego Un·ified Sch. Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 548 [171 P.2d 885] .)
Such a restraint is the more vicious because it penalizes not
only those who advocate overthrow of the government but
also those who do not but will not declare that they do not.
There are some who refuse to make the required declaration,
not because they advocate overthrow of the government, but
because they conscientiously believe that the state has no right
to inquire into matters so intimately touching political belief.
Rightly or wrongly they fear that such an inquiry is the
first step in censorship of unpopular ideas. Even in the face
of a bona fide danger, the state has no power to embark on
an unnecessary wholesale suppression of liberty. (See Butler
v. Michigan, 25 U.S.L. Week 4165, 4166.)
The majority opinion, however, invokes the rule that the
government may attain a legitimate objective through means
reasonably related thereto even though there is an incidental
restraint on speech. Thus, in securing qualified and trustworthy employees for government service a loyalty oath may
be required, not for the purpose of restraining speech, but
as a means of selection. (Adler v. Board of Ed1wation, 342
U.S. 485, 492 et seq. [72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517, 27 A.L.R.2d
472] ; Garner v. Board of Pnblic TV m·ks Los Angeles, 341
U.S. 716, 720 et seq. [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317]; Gerende v.
Baltimm·e etc. Board of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [71 S.Ct. 565,
~)5 L.Ed. 745] ; Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Education,
44 Cal.2d 816 [285 P.2d 617]; Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d
676 [249 P.2d 267] .) Similarly, American Conmmnications
Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925],
held that in serking to keep interstate commerce free of politic-al strikes, Congress may require labor officials to file nonCommunist affidavits as a condition to their unions' im·oking
the jurisdiction of the National IJabor Relations Board.
In such cases it is necessary to determine whether the provisions that incidentally restrain speech are in fact reasonably
related to the attainment of the governmental objective. In
Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269 [70 N.W.2d 605],
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 [76 S.Ct. 135, 100 L.Ed. 778], the
Supreme Court of \Visconsin considered a federal statute that
provided in effect that no housing unit constructed under the
statute could be occupied by a member of an organization designated as subversive by the attorney general. Pursuant to
this statute, the Milwaukee Housing Authority adopted a reso-
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lution that required its tenants to execute a certificate of nonmembership in the listed organizations. The court held the
resolution unconstitutional, and after discussing the Douds
case stated: "It is beyond our power to comprehend how
the evil which mig"\lt result from leasing units in a federally
aided housing project to tenants who are members of organizations designated subversive by the Attorney General is in
any way comparable in substantiality to that which would
result to the general welfare through communists in control
of labor organizations disrupting commerce by calling strikes
to carry out Communist Party policy. This court deems the
possible harm which might result in suppressing the freedoms
of the First Amendment outweigh any threatened evil posed
by the occupation by members of subversive organizations of
units in federally aided housing projects." (270 Wis. at 287288.) In considering the same problem, the Supreme Court
of Illinois pointed out that, ''The purpose of the Illinois
Housing Authority Act is to eradicate slums and provide
housing for persons of low-income class. [Citation.] It is
evident that the exclusion of otherwise qualified persons solely
because of membership in organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney General has no tendency whatever to
further such purpose." (Chicago Housing Authority v.
Blackman, 4 Ill.2d 319 [122 N.E.2d 522, 526] .)
In the present case the majority opinion thus states the
governmental objective: "Encouragement to loyalty to our
institutions and an incentive to defend one's country in the
event of hostilities ... doctrines \vhich the state has plainly
promulgated and intends to foster. It is the high purpose
residing in its people that the state is attempting to encourage in its endeavor to protect itself against subversive
infiltration. . . . Obviously a program of tax exemption
designed to promote adherence to the principles of our government but constrained to include within its bounty persons or
organizations actively advocating subversion and the support
of enemies in time of l10stilities, would be wholly without
reason and result in its own defeat.''
The issue thus narrows to whether a state can properly
restrain free speech in the interest of promoting what appears
to be eminently right thinking. A state with such power
becomes a monitor of thought to determine what is and what
is not right thinking. Great as a state's police power is,
however, the United States Supreme Court has yet to sanction
its breaking into people's minds to make them orderly. In
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holding that school children may not be compelled to salute
the flag as a condition to attending public schools, the Supreme
Com-t throng·h Mr .. fustiee ,Jaeb;on stated that, "To believe
that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine
is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. \Ve ean have intellectual individualism
and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes. ·when they are so harmless to others or to the
State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great.
But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, thry
do not now occur to us." (West Virginia Board of Education
v. Bar-nette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-642 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed.
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674] .)
Advocacy does not occur in an intellectual vacuum. Usually
it auswers or challenges other advocacy. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly stated in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
549-550 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137]: "Of course no
government can recognize a 'right' of revolution, or a 'right'
to incite revolution if the incitement has no other purpose
or effect. But speech is seldom restricted to a single purpose,
and its effects may be manifold. .A public interest is not
wanting in granting freedom to speak their minds even to
those who advocate the overthrow of the Government by force.
For, as the evidence in this case abundantly illustrates, coupled >Yith such advocacy is criticism of defects in our society.
Criticism is the spur to reform; and Burke's admonition that
a healthy society must reform in order to conserve has not lost
its force. Astute observers have remarked that one of the
characteristics of the American Republic is indifference to
fundamental criticism. Bryce, The American Commonwealth,
c. 84. It is a commonplace that there may be a grain of
truth in the most uncouth doctrine, however false and repellant the balance may be. Suppressing advocates of overthrow
48 C.2d-15
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inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate overthrow but fear that their criticism may be so construed. No
matter how clear we may be that the defendants now before
us are preparing to overthrow our Government at the propitious moment, it is self-delusion to think that we can punish
them for their advocacy without adding to the risks run by
loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the reforms
these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in sustaining the convictions before us we can hardly escape restriction on the interchange of ideas.''
Section 32 impedes not only advocacy itself but discussion
short of advocacy that may be of the utmost value. As Mr.
Justice Jackson pointed out in the Dennis case, ''Of course,
it is not always easy to distinguish teaching or advocacy in
the sense of incitement from teaching or advocacy in the sense
of exposition or explanation," and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
recognized that, "there is no divining rod by which we may
locate 'advocacy.' Exposition of ideas readily merges into
advocacy." ( 341 U.S. at 545, 572.) Yet section 32 compels
the cautious to forego discussion for fear they will overstep
the line that no divining rod can locate.
Errors in thought or expression are best counteracted by
deeper thought and more cogent expression. Only through
free discussion can subversive doctrines be understood and
effectively combatted. '' 'The interest, which [the First
Amendment] guards, and which gives it its importance, presupposes that there are no orthodoxies-religious, political,
economic, or scientific-which are immune from debate and
dispute. Back of that is the assumption-itself an orthodoxy,
and the one permissible exception-that truth will be most
likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed upon utterances
that can with any plausibility be regarded as efforts to present
grounds for accepting or rejecting propositions whose truth
the utterer asserts, or denies.' . . . In the last analysis it is
on the validity of this faith that our national security is
staked." (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137] .)
The majority opinion in the present case goes far beyond
any United States Supreme Court decision in upholding legislation that restricts the citizen's right to speak freely. Section
19 of article XX, implemented by section 32 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code, arbitrarily assumes that those who seek
tax exemptions advocate overthrow of the government unless
they declare otherwise. The provisions infringe the right to
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engage in such advocacy without reference to its seriousness,
inhibit free discussion short of advocacy, and penalize the
belief that the government has no right to require professions
of innocence in the absence of proof of guilt. A law with such
consequences cannot stand in the face of the constitutional
guarantees.
I would reverse the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I approach the consideration of this case with a profound
consciousness that the problems involved may have a direct
impact upon the stability of our state and federal governments. Evidently those who enacted the legislation here involved felt that it was necessary to preserve the status quo
of those governments. On the other hand the plaintiff challenges the enactments as an invasion of fundamental constitutional guarantees to it and other religious institutions. We
are, therefore, at the outset, faced with the problem as to what
:,;auctions, in the way of pledges of fealty and loyalty, our
government may exact from a taxpayer in order to qualify
the latter for a tax exemption granted to all in the same class.
The solution of this problem depends upon our interpretation
and application of the constitutional guarantees relied upon
by plaintiff as barriers against such sanctions.
It must be remembered that while our government was
''conceived in liberty,'' it was born in revolution. The Declaration of Independence was the antithesis of a pledge of
allegiance or loyalty to the British government of which the
then American colonists were a part. This memorable document epitomized the concept of its framers of the objects and
purposes of government and the right of the people to change
it by force if necessary. It declared: "\Ve hold these truths
to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments arc instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed; that whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or to abolish it and to institute new government, laying
its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
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safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, ·will dictate that
governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath
shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils
are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms
to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses
and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces
a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their
right, it is their duty, to throw off such government and to
provide new guards for their future security. Such has been
the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the
necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems
of government."
The events which followed the adoption of the Declaration
of Independence by the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776,
are well known to every student of American history. These
events culminated in the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 where the Constitution
of the United States was drafted. Many of the delegates
at the Constitutional Convention had been members of the
Continental Congress which had adopted the Declaration of
Independence. They were revolutionists in the truest and
most dignified sense. It should be remembered that the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States were prepared by a group of men who had endured tyranny under a monarchial form of government for
over three generations. They were the leaders in the struggle
which overthrew that government and they sought to establish
a government of the people, by the people, and for the people,
which would derive its just powers from the consent of the
governed. They sought to establish justice, ensure domestic
tranquility, promote the general welfare, provide for the
common defense and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity-a government which would govern
without tyranny and without oppression and which would
guarantee to the governed all of the liberty that a free people
in a homogenous society could enjoy.
The great liberality accorded to the guarantees of freedom
of speech and press by those at the head of our government
during its formative period is exemplified by the following
statement in the First Inaugural Address of President Thomas
Jefferson. He there declared : "If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican
form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety

Apr. 1957] FIRsT UNITARIAN CHURCH v. CouNTY OF L.A.

453

[48 C.2d 419; 311 F.2d 508]

with which error of opinion may be tolerated ·where reason
is left free to combat it.'' This same concept was again
expressed by Mr. Jefferson in his letter to Benjamin Rush in
these words: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal
hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of
man." This concept was more recently depicted by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. Califm·nia, 274 U.S. 357 [47 S.Ct.
641, 71 L.Ed. 1095], in words that will forever be a part of
our American heritage. ''Those who won our independence
I.Jy revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political
change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in tlle power of
free and fearless reasoning applied .through the process of
popular government, no danger flowing from free speech can
be deemed clear and present unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may be fatal before there
is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence.''
Over a century and a half has elapsed since the above quoted
utterances of Thomas J effcrson. Our government has withstood one major revolution and several minor armed rebellions
but the fundamental basic concept of civil liberties embraced
within the Bill of Rights has remained unimpaired.
It is worthy of note that the framers of the Constitution of
the United States saw fit to exact of the person who assumed
the office of President a very simple oath which reads as
follows: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and
will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution of the United States.'' (U.S. Const., art. II,
§ 1.) This is the only oath mentioned in the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the great trust reposed in and power conferred upon the President of the United States by the Constitution and laws enacted by Congress, no other oath or pledge
of loyalty may be exacted of him. Nevertheless no president
has ever been suspected of disloyalty. It may be said with
eonfidence that history has demonstrated the wisdom of the
framers of the Constitution in drafting an oath so simple and
yet so effective that it has endured the tests of time and
trial. The past at least is secure. But such an oath was not
deemed sufficient to insure the loyalty and fealty of the Vice
President, members of Congress and other officials of our
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national government. Although no other official of our government possesses the po>ver or authority of the President, they
are required to take an oath much more exacting as it amounts
to a pledge of allegiance. This oath is contained in an act of
Congress and is as follows : ''I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me
God.'' (U.S. Code, title V, § 16, pp. 10-11, U.S.C. 1952 ed.,
titles 1-14.) I find no fault with this oath and recognize the
propriety of exacting such an oath from one who assumes an
official position with our government. It will be observed,
however, that neither of the above quoted oaths has the slightest resemblance to the test oath here involved. In commenting on such an oath Dr. Carl Joachim Friedrich, Professor
of Government, of Harvard University had the following to
say: "It is depressing to realize that the oath has always
cropped up as a political device when the political order was
crumbling. In the period of religious dissensions the oath of
allegiance made its appearance in England as an instrument
of intolerance and, a little later, of royal oppression. James
Stuart, the tiresome pedant on the throne, sought refuge in
an oath required of all ministers and the like (most teaching
then being religious). At that time the imperial pretensions
of the 'reformed' papacy, the right of the Pope claimed by
the Jesuits to absolve the subjects of an heretical king from
their allegiance, made the king desirous of testing the loyalty
of his more influential subjects. Yet not many years later
his son's head rolled in to the sand.
"Following that, Oliver Cromwell in his desperate efforts
to find a legitimate basis for his dictatorial regime, demanded
an oath preceding the election of parliament in 1653 that no
one participating in the election would allow the constitution
'as settled in one person and parliament' to be disturbed. But
Cromwell died and the oath was forgotten. The rupture which
the oath was supposed to heal did not disappear until toleration and a liberal, truly constitutional government had taught
people how Catholic and Protestant, how parliamentarian and
authoritarian, how "Whig and Tory could live peaceably together, with no one requiring the other to swear oaths which
were either unnecessary or ineffectual.
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"And where have oaths appeared in our own day 1 In
Fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany. In both of these countries
the dictators have promulgated requirements according to
which the teachers and professors have to swear an oath of
allegiance to the Duce, the Leader. But what, one may ask,
was the object of demanding such a declaration from men who
every day were obliged to mold their words and their teachings
to the Fascist creed? The purpose was to humiliate or to
destroy them. There were plenty of men who were known to
the students as non-Fascists, non-Nazis. If they could be
forced into swearing their allegiance to the official creed, they
were morally discredited, they were shown to be trimmers.
What is more, the man of integrity and of faith is the really
dangerous enemy. He would not consent. He would protest.
Gaetano Salvemini, now teaching at Harvard, is such a man.
He knew the game of Mussolini and he left.'' (Article entitled "Teacher's Oaths," published in the January, 1936
issue of Harper's, vol. 172 at p. 171.)
At this point, I cannot refrain from quoting the words of
warning contained in the powerful concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 [73
S.Ct. 215, 97 I.~.Ed. 216] : "History indicates that individual
liberty is intermittently subjected to extraordinary perils ....
The first years of our Republic marked such a period. Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws by zealous patriots who
feared ideas made it highly dangerous for people to think,
speak, or write critically about government, its agents, or its
policies, either foreign or domestic. Our constitutional liberties survived the ordeal of this regrettable period because there
were influential men and powerful organized groups bold
rnough to champion the undilutrd right of individuals to
publish and argue for their beliefs however unorthodox or
loathsome. Today, however, few people and organizations of
power and influence argue that unpopular advocacy has this
same wholly unqualified immunity from governmental interference. For this and other reasons the present period of
fear seems more ominously dangerous to speech and press
than was that of the Alien and Sedition Laws. Suppressive
laws and practices are the fashion. The Oklahoma oath
statute is but one manifestation of a national network of laws
aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of men. Test
oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. When used to shackle
the mind they are, or at least they should be, unspeakably
odi&us to a free people. Test oaths are made still more danger-
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ous when combined with bills of attainder which like this
Oklahoma statute impose pains and penalties for past lawful
associations and utterances.
''. . . Our own free society should never forget that laws
which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the
unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing
many more people than at first intended. We m1tst have
ft·ecdorn of speech fm· all or we will in the long ntn have it
for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too
often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of
public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly
lost." (Emphasis added.)
History is replete with accounts of the many stratagems
ereated by tyrants to Yiolate the individual's liberty. But it
is also replete with accounts of man's constant warfare against
these devices and victories won by courageous judges, legislators, administrators, lawyers, and citizens.
ln 1787, the founders of this nation assumed that they had
settled these matters for all time when they drew upon the
lessons of history and wrote a Bill of Rights to assure the
individual permanent freedom from official tyranny, and the
right freely to participate in the process of self-government.
''Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances, real
or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go
par·i passn with the supposed evil. They withstand the winds
of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past.
Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a
squalid huckster of bad liquor may take on a very different
face, if used by a government determined to suppress political
opposition under the guise of sedition.'' (Learned Hand, J.,
in United States v. Kirschenblatt ( C.C.A.2d), 16 F.2d 202,
203 [51 A.L.R. 416] .)
''These specific grievances and the safeguards against their
recurrence were not defined by the Constitution. They were
defined by history. Their meaning was so settled by history
that definition was superfluous .... 'Upon this point a page
of history is worth a volume of logic.' New York Tntst Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 [ 41 S. Ct. 506, 65 L.Ed. 963, 16
A.L.R. 660]." (Frankfurter, .J., United States v. Lovett
(1945), 328 U.S. 303,321.323 [66 S.Ct.l073, 90 L.Ed. 1252].)
"It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which
the framers of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746], in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed.
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, and in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 P.S. :38:1 [ 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 hEel. 319, 24
A.hR 14261) have deelared the importanee to political liberty
and to the welfare of our eonntry of the due observance of
the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by these two
amendments. The effect of the decisions cited is: That such
rights are declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment
oE personal seeurity, personal liberty, and private property;'
that they are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the g·naranty of them is as important
and as imperative as are the guaranties to the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen-the right to trial by
jury, to the \Vrit of habeas corpus, and to due process of law.
It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreeiation' of the rights secured by them, by impereeptible practiee of courts, or by
well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers." ( Goulcd v. United States (1920), 255 U.S. 298, 303
[41 S.Ct. 261, 65 I"'.Ed. 647], Clarke, J.) (Emphasis supplied.) Sec also: Brandeis, ,J. dissenting, Olrnsfcacl v. United
States (1927), 277 U.S. 438, 476, 478 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed.
944, 66 A.LR. 376), and .Jones v. Securities & Exch. Com.
(1935), 298 U.S. 1, 28 [56 S.Ct. 654, 80 L.Ed. 1015].
''If there is one fixed star in our Constitutional constellation, it is that no offieial, high OJ' petty, ean prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force c?:tizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." (,Jackson, J., in West ViJ'(Jinia State
Board of Ed11cation v. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 642
[63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 I.1.Ed. 1628, 147 A.I.1.R. 674] .) (Emphasis
supplied.)
rrhe story of the rise and fall of the oath ex-officio needs
to be retold. It will be reealled that the early 1200's were
marked by the adoption of this proeednral deviee in the
ecelcsiastical courts. In this period the inquisitional oath
began to take the place of the trial by eompurgation oaths in
the ecclesiastic-al courts. The compurgation trials c-onducted
with the device of "oath helpers" had become little better
than a farc·e. The new method of the oath ex-officio was one
which pledged the accused to answer truly and was followed
by a rational process of judicial probing by questions on the
speeific details of the affair. Jn a footnote by John H. Wigmore in 15 Harvard I1aw Review 615, it is stated that by the
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middle of the 13th century "the new oath became the customary instrument in the papal inquisition of heresy; which,
indeed, owed its effectiveness largely to the new methods.''
I_jiberals in the church courts insisted that the oath could
only be imposed if the court had a rational hypothesis for
proceeding against the suspect. Such rational hypothesis
could either be fama p1tblica or clamosa insinnatio. However,
this was too mild for those who wanted a more vigorous pursuit
of heretics and schismatics, and they finally prevailed in establishing the doctrine that the oath could be imposed by the
church official ex-officio without any antecedent foundation.
'l'his extreme position, however, directly resulted in the downfall of the power of the ecclesiastical courts because of the
public indignation it aroused.
The ordinary course of trial by the Inquisition was this.
A man would be reported to the inquisitor as of ill-repute for
heresy, or his name would occur in the confessions of some
other prisoners. A secret inquisition would be made and
all accessible evidence against him would be collected. When
the mass of surmises and gossip, exaggerated and distorted by
the natural fear of the witnesses, eager to save themselves
from the suspicion of favoring heretics, grew sufficient for
action, the blow would fall. The accused was then prejudged.
He >vas assumed to be guilty, or he would not have been put
on trial, and virtually his only mode of escape was by
confessing the charges against him, abjuring heresy, and
accepting whatever punishment might be imposed on him in
the shape of penance. Persistent denial of guilt and assertion
of orthodoxy, when there was evidence against him, rendered
him an impenitent, obstinate heretic, to be abandoned to the
secular arm and consigned to the state. (See Henry Charles
Lea, A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, I, p.
407.)
However, the English people early registered their resistance to general inquisitorial methods and their attendant
abuses. A statute passed in 1360 in the reign of Edward III,
provided, "that all general inquiries before this time granted
within any seignories, for the mischiefs and oppression which
have been done to the people by such inquiries, shall utterly
cease and be repealed." ( 34 Edw. III, ch. 1.)
But in 1583 the Court of High Commission in Causes
Ecclesiastical, under the leadership of Archbishop Whitgift,
started a crusade against heresy wherever it could be found,
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examining suspected persons under oath in most extreme
ex-officio style.
In 1609 Sir Edward Coke, as Chief Justice of Common
Pleas, granted prohibition against the High Court of Ecclesiastical Causes in Edward's case. (13 Rep. 9.) Edward had
been charged with libel and the church court put him under
the ex-officio oath to compel him to state his meaning of the
libelous words he was accused of uttering. The common law
court took jurisdiction away from the church court upon the
ground, among others, that ''in cases where a man is to be
examined upon his oath, he ought to be examined upon acts
or words, and not of the intentions or thought of his heart;
and if any man should be examined upon his oath of the
opinion he holdeth concerning any point of religion, he is not
bound to answer the same.''
But the oath ex-officio persisted and the Court of the Star
Chamber began during James' reign to use the ex-officio oath
in stamping out sedition. Here the common law courts were
powerless to prevent employment of the oath procedure because they lacked jurisdiction over the Court of the Star
Chamber.
In 1639 the Court of the Star Chamber examined John
Lilburn, "Freeborn John," an opponent of the Stuarts. on a
charge of printing or importing certain heretical and seditious
books. Lilburn refused to answer questions ''concerning other
men, to insnare me, and to get further matter against me.''
The Council of the Star Chamber condemned him to be
whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take
a legal oath," without which many offenses might go "undiscovered and unpunished." (See 3 How. State Trials 1315,
et seq.)
The whip that lashed "Freeborn John" smashed the Court
of the Star Chamber as well. In July, 1641, Parliament abolished the Court of the Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission for Ecclesiastical Causes, and provided by statute
that no ecclesiastical court could thereafter administer an
ex-offic1:o oath on penal matters. In 1645 the House of Lords
set aside Lilburn's sentence and in 1648 Lilburn was granted
£3000 reparation for the whipping which he had received.
Meanwhile, the scene of struggle against oaths ex-offic1:o 1vas
carried to colonial America. The story is well told by R.
Carter Pittman in 21 Virginia Law Rev. 763 from which the
following quotations are taken:
"The settlement of the English colonials in the new world
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took place at a time in English History when opposition
to the ex-officio oath of the ecdesiastieal courts \vas most pronounced, and at the period when the insistence upon the
privilege against self-incrimination in the courts of common
law had begun to have decided effect. . . . The e.r-officio oath,
as employed in the ecclesiastical courts, which regulated the
most intimate details of men's daily life, and more particularly
by the Court of High Commission, was possibly the most
hated instrument employed to create the unhappy plight of
these Puritans and Separatists. . . .
"About getting out of England there was much 'red tape'
and it consisted in the most part of taking oaths-the oath of
Supremacy and the oath of Allegiance, etc. For days and
weeks thousands waited aboard ship in the river Thames until
this oath ordeal was over and after that they were forced with
a refined cruelty to say the prayers in the Anglican prayer
books twice a day at sea . . . . "
The trial of Mrs. Ann Hutchinson before Governor ·winthrop of Massachusetts in the year 1637 was recalled by Mr.
,Justice Black in .Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct.
1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223], when he commented at
page 88:
"1\Irs. Hutchinson was tried, if trial it can be called, for
holding unorthodox religious views. PeoplP with a consuming
belief that their religious convictions must be forced on others
rarely ever believe that the unorthodox have any rights which
should or can be rightfully respected. As a result of her trial
and compelled admissions, Mrs. Hutchinson was found guilty
of unorthodoxy and banished from Massachusetts. The lamentable experience of Mrs. Hutchinson and others, contributed
to the over-whelming sentiment that demanded adoption of
the Constitutional Bill of Rights. The founders of this Government wanted no more such 'trials' and punishments as
Mrs. Hutchinson had to undergo. They wanted to erect barriers that would bar legislators from passing laws that encroached on the domain of belief, and that would, among other
things, strip courts and alltJnblie officers o.f a power to compel
people to testify against themselves." (Emphasis supplied.)
But the ingenuity of those who would use the oath against
the unorthodox was undaunted.
See Harr'ison v. Evans, 1 Eng-lish Reports, 1437, decided by
the House of I.. ords in 1767. Evans was a Protestant Dissenter
and this fact \YaS known to the r. ord :Mayor of London.
Nevertheless, the Mayor appointed Evans to fill a vacancy as
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sheriff, despite the existence of an act providing that no
person should be admitted to any office who had not, within
the twelve preceding months ''received the sacrament of the
Lord's Supper aecording to the rites of the Church of
England." Because of this statute Evans could not take the
oath of office or assume it, and he was assessed for a statutory
penalty of £600 which was made applicable to any citizen who
refused to assume an office after being appointed thereto.
The House of Lords,
a 6 to 1 vote, ruled with the dissenting Evans, overturned the judgments of the lower courts and
returned to him his £600.
"Test oaths, designed to impose civil disabilities upon men
for their beliefs rather than for unlawful conduct were an
abomination to the founders of this nation. This feeling was
made manifest in Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no religious test shall e·vcr be required as a qttalification to any office or public trust under the United States."
(Black, J., dissenting In re Summers (1945), 325 U.S. 561,
576 [65 S.Ct. 1807, 89 L.Ed. 1795].) (Emphasis supplied.)
"No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer
than that of securing for the people of the United States much
greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition
than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed. It cannot
be denied, for example, that the rcl1:giou.s test oath or the
restrictions upon assembly then prevalent in England would
have been regarded as measures which the Constitution prohibited the American Congress from passing." (Emphasis
supplied.) (Bridges v. California (1941), 314 U.S. 252 at
265 [62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346] .)
It is revealing to note that test oaths and the struggle
against them arose at a time when the division between
church and state was in its early stages, when the separation
was far from complete. 'rhe immunity from compulsory disclosure which ultimately developed affected not only the right
of the individual to worship as he pleased but also his right,
notwithstanding his place or mode of worship, to hold political
office. The protection accorded religious belief developed hand
in hand with nonsectarianism in government.
This policy has been recognized in the United States. While
the original purpose behind the abolition of the test oath may
have been to further religious liberty, the effect has been
to extend political liberty. The following statement is illustrative: ''This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to
religious aetivity and institutions alone. The First Amendment
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gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 [45
S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070]. Great secular causes, with small
ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the
right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly,
are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of
free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of
human interest." (Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531
[65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430].)
The California 1897 Direct Primary Act permitted political
parties to require persons, as a condition of voting at the
primary, to give an oath that they would thereafter support
the nominees of that party. That statute was declared unconstitutional and the Supreme Court, in Spier v. Baker (1898),
120 Cal. 370, said at page 379 [52 P. 659, 41 L.R.A. 196] :
''. . . And the moment you recognize the existence of power
in the legislature to create tests in these primary elections,
you recognize the right of the legislature to create any test
which to that body may seem proper. While the test prescribed in this act may be said to be a most reasonable one,
yet the right to make it carries with it the right to make
tests most unreasonable. If the power rests in the legislature
to create a test, then the power is found in a Democratic
legislature to make the test at a primary election a belief in
the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, and
the same power is found in a Republican legislature to make
the test a belief in the protective tariff. If such a power may
be sustained under the constitution, then the life and death of
political parties are held in the hollow of the hand by a state
legislature.''
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed.
430], the same thought is expressed: ''But it cannot be the
duty, because it is not the right of the state to protect the
public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First
Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a
guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press,
speech, and religion. In this field every person m7tst be his
own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not
tntst any government to separate the true from the false for
us." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the light of the foregoing discussion, let us consider
the attacks made by plaintiff upon the oath here required.
It is contended, with merit, that the oath here is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection clauses of both
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the federal and state Constitutions and that it also violates
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Section 32 makes an exception insofar as the householder's
$100 exemption on personal property is concerned. While it
cannot be denied that the Legislature in its wisdom may
classify in order that certain evils may be avoided in the
future, such classification must bear a reasonable relation to
the evil to be avoided. TherB is here no reasonable classification when the evil to be avoided is considered. There is no
evidence that any of the churches or veterans here involved
advocated, or intended to advocate, the forbidden political
philosophy. The constitutional amendment and section 32
appear to be a sort of shotgun attempt on the part of the
Legislature to hit an undefined object. In other words, there
is no relation between the object to be achieved and the tactics
taken to achieve it. A statement made in the majority opinion
clearly shows the fallacy in the entire affair. That statement
reads as follows: ''By its enactment [section 19 of article
XX] the people of the state declared the public policy of
withholding from the owners of property in this state who
engage in the prohibited activities the benefits of tax exemption. The denounced activities are criminal offenses under
state law (Stats. 1919, p. 281), and the act of Congress
known as the Smith Act (54 Stat. 670) makes it unlawful to
advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence." It should be emphatically stated and understood
that not one of the churches or veterans here involved has
been so much as accused of subversive activities. But
through their refusal to take the unconstitutional (as I
believe) oath, they are penalized in advance for something they have not done and will, in all probability, never
do. By the majority opinion we are informed that the
reason for the oath is to protect state revenues from impairment by those who would seek to destroy it by unlawful
means. An entirely different situation would be presented had
any of those involved sought to destroy the state, but here only
future highly problematical activity is forsworn although the
tax is levied for past ownership of property to which the exemption was applicable. Just why charitable institutions are
singled out as presenting the greatest danger to this country
in time of peace or war is not made clear in the majority
opinion. It is Hornbook law that legislation classifying certain groups for corrective purposes must bear a reasonable

464

Fms'r

TTKrTARIAN

CHURCH v.

CouNTY OF

L. A.

[48 C.2d

relationship to the object to be achieved. Churches would,
indeed, seem to me to be the least likely subjects of classification for legislative measurrs to correct thr evil thought to
exist. Veterans, also, are those who have risked their lives
or have been willing to risk them to uphold the ideals for
\Yhich this country stands. 'l'he exemptions were granted,
in the first im;tance, so that religions work might be carried
on with the least amount of tax burden possible to the end
that the money saved thereby might be used to promote the
general ·welfare; in the second instance, to Yeterans because
they gave up homes, families and positions to promote the
general \vdfare insofar as protecting this country from an
enemy >vas concerned. It hardly seems logieal to assume that
laws removing the tax exemptions from those dedicated to
the promotion of tlw general welfal'e lH·c·;wse the)' 1nir;ht, in
the future, decide to do a turn-about-face and destr-oy tlw
general welfare can be said to be a reasonable classification.
If there is one principle that has al·ways (heretofore) been
clearly understood in this country it is that every person is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The legislation involYecl. here pn'snnw~ ihat one refusing to sign the oath has been, or will soon be, guilty of
treasonable conduet. From what is said in the majority
opinion it appears that this thought did oecur to the members
of the eourt signing it. \V e arP informed that there is a presumption of innocence bnt that the assessor, beeause of it, is
not relieved from making the investigation enjoined on him
by law; that his administrative determindion is not binding
on the tax exemption elaimant "but it is sufflcient to authorize him to tax the property as non-exrmpt and to place the

bur-den on the claimant to test the validity of his administr-ative deter-mination in a cou1·t of law.'' \Vhat is this but foreing the supposedly subversive organization or person to prove
1:tsclf or himself innocent beyond a reasonable doubt?
In testing the reasonableness of the laws under attack here,
the next question which presents itself is why are householders excepted from those who must take the oath before
any tax exemption is allowed them? \V e are told that the
"segment of householders in this state is so owrwhelmingly
large as compared with others ehm;('n for exemption that the
cost of processing them would justify their separate classification." If this class is so "overwhelmingly large" it would
appear that if the old adage "in numbers lie strength" is
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true, that this class should also be required to take the oath
prior to claiming the exemption. It would also appear that
mere difficulty in "processing" would be of little moment in
an undertaking thought to be so vitally necessary. J:i'urthermore, if the principle behind the oath is, as we are told, to
prevent those dangerous persons from depleting the state's
revenues, it would appear that this "overwhelmingly large"
class might, even though the exemption is a relatively small
one, deplete it even more than the revenues from tl10se which
fall within the legislation. 1'he Supreme Court of the United
States said (Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,
37 r48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770]) that "The equal proteetion
elause, like the due process of law f•Jause, is not snseeptible
of exact delimitation. No definite rule in respect of either,
which automatically will solve the question in speeific instances, can be formulated. Certain general principles, however, have been established in the light of which tbe cases as
they arise are to be considered. In the first place, it may be
said generally that the equal protection clause means that the
rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under
similar circumstances, Kentucky Railr·oacZ Tax Cases, 115 U.S.
321, 337 [6 S.Ct. 57, 29 IJ.Ed. 4141; JJfarJmm v. Illinois Trust
&; Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 [18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed.
1037], and tl1at it applies to the exercise of all the power;;
of the state which can affect the individual or his property,
including the power of taxation. Connfy of Santa Clara v.
Southern Pac. R. Co., J8 F. 385, 388-399 [9 Savvy. 1651; The
Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 733 [8 Sawy. 2381. It does
not, however, forbid claflsification; and the power of the state
to classify for purposes of taxation is of wide range and
flexibility, provided always, that the classification 'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial rrlation to tl1e
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 I 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 LEd. 9891 ;
Air-way etc. Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71. 85 145 S.Ct. 12, 69
L.Ed. 169] ; Schlesinger V. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 240 r46
S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557, 43 A.L.R. 12241. That is to say,
1nere difference is not enough : the attempted classification
'must always rest upon somr difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily
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and without any such basis.' Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 [17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666]."
There is in my mind no doubt whatsoever that the legislation with which we are here concerned bears no relation whatsoever to the objective to be achieved. Presumably that objective is to stamp out, by any means at hand, the promulgation of unpopular ideas. While the idea of the overthrow
of the government of this country by force and violence in
either peace or war is as abhorrent to me as it is to the majority of Americans, I am at a complete loss when it comes to
imagining any reasonable theory on which the legislation in
question can be considered an effective way of preventing such
action. The tax itself is on property owned by churches and
used for religious purposes and the exemption applies only
when such property is used for such purposes. So far as the
veteran's exemption is concerned, the tax to which it applies
is also on property. Property taxes and unpopular beliefs or
advocacy would appear to be as far apart as the poles and
to bear no reasonable relationship one to the other. The
classification here involved falls directly within the rule of
the Louisville Gas case: it is arbitrary, it does not rest upon a
difference bearing a reasonable and just relation to the act
in respect to which the classification is proposed; it is a mere
difference which ''is not enough.''
THE OATH Is A VIOLATION OF THE CoNsTITUTIONAL GuARANTEE OF FREEDOl\1[ OF SPEECH :
In Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536,
542 [ 171 P .2d 885], we held that "Freedom of speech and of
peaceable assembly are protected by the First Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States against infringement
by Congress. They are likewise protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against infringement by state Legislatures.
(Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed.
430] ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 [57 S.Ct. 255,
81 L.Ed. 278] .) However reprehensible a Legislature may
regard certain convictions or affiliations, it cannot forbid them
if they present 'no clear and present danger that they will
bring abotd the substantive evils' that the Legislature has a
right to prevent. 'It is a question of proximity and degree.'
(Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63
L.Ed. 470].) The United States Supreme Court has been
alive to the difference between remote dangers and substantial
ones, between remote dangers and immediate ones . . . ' . . .
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Moreover, the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil
will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of
speech or the press. The evil itself must be ''substantial,''
Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, supra,
274 U.S. at page 374; it must be "serious," id. 274 U.S. at
page 376. And even the expression of "legislative preferences
or beliefs'' cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient
weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression .
. . . '" (Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 [62 S.Ct.
190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R 1346], quoting from the concurring opinion of Mr. ,Justice Brandeis in "Whitney v. Califo1"nia, 247 U.S. 357, 374 [47 S.Ct. 641, 71 I.J.Ed. 1095].)
A reading of the majority opinion leaves in the minds of
the reader the implication that the ''clear and present danger" rule was abrogated by the later case of Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137]. In the
Dennis case it was specifically noted by the court that in the
Smith Act ''Congress did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories, to destroy the traditional rights
of Americans to discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of
governmental sanction. Rather Congress was concerned with
the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these
petitioners engaged." It will be recalled that we have here
no evidence that the churches and veterans involved were
even so much as accused of the forbidden activities. In the
Dennis case the petitioners had been found guilty by a jury
of organizing a Communist party in the United States; in
knowingly and wilfully teaching and advocating the overthrow of our government by force and violence. The court
also held that it had been determined that the evidence amply
supported the necessary finding of the jury that the petitioners "were unwilling to work within our framework of
democracy, but intended to initiate a violent revolution whenever the propitious occasion appeared.'' In the majority
opinion in the Dennis case it was said that "Overthrow of
the Government by force ancl violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech" and
speaking of the "clear and present danger" rule it was said
''Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.
If Government is aware that a group m"ming at its overthrow
is attempting to indoct1·inate its members and to commit them
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to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel
the circ1imstanccs perrnit, action by the Government is requit'ed." (Emphasis added.) The court expressly rejected
the contention that success or probability of success in overthrowing the government was the criterion. The court then,
in speaking of prior cases, said that the court had not been
''confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one
-the development of an apparatus designed and dedicated
to the overthrow of the Government, in the context of world
erisis after crisis.'' 'l'he Supreme Court then stated the rule,
relied upon by the majority here, that "In each case [courts]
must ask IYhether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.'' This rule, following the
court's language concerning what constituted a ''clear and
present'' danger and read in the light of the facts as they
were stated in the Dennis case, shows the absurdity of this
tempest-in-a-teapot which which we are here confronted: there
is no showing that the churches and veterans were highly
organized into a war-like machine dedicated to the overthrow
of the government by force and violence with leaders highly
trained and ready to give the "word" when the time was ripe
for revolution! The objects of the legislation, the objective
alld the mc'ans used to achieve it are completely unrelated.
\Vhene is the "danger" so far as churches and veterans are
eoneerned? And does the denial of a charitable exemption
consti tnte a reasonable attempt to save this country from
revolution? Or does the oath involved just constitute an
unconstitutional invasion of freedom of speech? In my
opinion it eonstitutes an unconstitutional invasion of freedom
of speeeh with the absurdity of the entire situation pinpointed by the thought that any embryo revolutionist would
surely not hesitate to subscribe to sueh an oath.
As Mr. ,Justice Douglas said in his dissenting opinion in
the Dennis case, ''Full and free discussion keeps a society
from beeoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and
strainR that work to tear all eivilization apart.
''Full and free discussion has indeed been the first artiele
of our faith. \V e have founded our political system on it.
It has been the safeguard of every religious, political. philosophieal, economic, and raeial group amongst us. We have
eounted on it to keep us from embraeing what is cheap and
false; >ve have trusted the eommon sense of our people to
choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest.
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This has been the one single outstanding tenet that has made
our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality. We
have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised
minority than to let them vent their spleen. vVe have above
all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land
where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and
cultures of the world.
"There comes a time when even speech loses its constitutional immunity. Speeeh innocuous one year may at another
time fan such destructive flames that it must be halted in
the interests of the safety of the Republic. That is the meaning of the clear and present danger test. ·when conditions
are so eritical that there will be no time to avoid the evil
that the speech threatens, it is time to eall a halt. Otherwise,
free speech which is the strength of the Nation will be the
cause of its destruction.
''Yet free speech is the rule, not the exception. The restraint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear,
on more than passionate opposition against thr sprech. on
more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be
some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is
allowed.''
Mr. Justice Douglas said that "If this were a case where
those who claimed protection under the First Amendment
were teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of
the President, the filching of documents from public files,
the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like,
I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious
conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and
immorality. This case was argued as if those werr the facts.
The argument imported much seditions conduct into the record.
That is easy and it has popular appeal, for the activities of
Communists in plotting and scheming against the free world
are common knowledge. But the fact is that no such evidence was introduced at thr trial." Thr book~ on Leninism
and Communism, etc., whirh wrrr involvrd in the Drnnis casr
were commented on by Mr. Justice Douglas as follows: "ThosE'
books are to Soviet Communism what Mein Kampf was to
Nazism. If they are understood, the ugliness of Communism
is revealed, its deceit and cunning are exposed. the nature of
its activities becomes apparent, and the chaners of its success less likely. That is not, of course, the reason why petitioners chose these books for their classrooms. They are fer-
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vent Communists to whom these volumes are gospel. They
preached the creed with the hope that some day it would be
acted upon." Mr. Justice Douglas then continued: "The
vice of treating speech as the equivalent of overt acts of a
treasonable or seditious character is emphasized by a concurring opinion [Mr. Justice Jackson], which by invoking the
law of conspiracy makes speech do service for deeds which are
dangerous to society . . . . I repeat that we deal here with
speech alone, not with speech plus acts of sabotage or unlawful conduct. Not a single seditious act is charged in the indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because two
men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling
proportions. That course is to make a radical break with the
past and to violate one of the cardinal principles of our constitutional scheme.''
I repeat that in the case at bar we haven't even had speech
let alone any facts.
Neither prejudice nor hate nor senseless fear should be the basis for abridging freedom of speech.
''Free speech-the glory of our system of governmentshould not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil advocated is imminent."
American democracy is no accident; it is the majestic product of a vigorous, experimental and passionate history. This
nation came into existence as the result of a purposeful struggle
against governmental tyranny. The heritage of Thomas J efferson-"Rebellion to Tyrants is obedience to God"- remains with us, embodied in our institutions and traditions.
The spirit of Inquisition, which was abjured in the Declaration of Independence, has always been obnoxious to our
political and social life. Equally, it has found no tolerance
in our legal codes, our legal traditions, our juridical morality.
Due process has meant a fair, legal process. Liberty has
meant genuine, concrete liberty for the individual citizen-his
right to freedom from search and seizure, his right to privacy,
his right to be free of persecutory inquisition on grounds of
race, color, creed, political opinion or association.
At this truly grave moment in our nation's growth it is in
the power of this court to speak forthrightly in the language
of Coke, Camden, and Bradley, in the language of the many
illustrious jurists for whom the frenzy of the political market
place never blurred the meaning of freedom.
''Under our constitutional system courts stand against any
winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered,
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or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and
public excitement . . . . No higher duty, nor more solemn
responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of translating
into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield
deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every
human being subject to our Constitution-of whatever race,
creed or persuasion." (Chambers v. IJ'lorida ( 1940), 309
U.S. 227, 241 [60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716].)
\Vhat is required at this moment of this court is not innovation, but rather a restatement of the glowing principles
by which the history of the western world has given dignity
to its citizens : ''Historical liberties and privileges are not to
bend from day to day because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. A community whose judges would be
willing to give it whatever law might gratify the impulse of
the moment would find in the end that it had paid too high a
price." (Cardozo, J., JJ1atter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 268
[177 N.E. 489].)
The issue is momentous, of far-reaching implication, and
the ruling of the court will be a categorical imperative whose
cumulative effect will be seen only in the fullness of time.
"Nothing less is involved than that which makes for an
atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repression for society as a whole. The dangers are not fanciful.
We too readily forget them. Recollection may be refreshed
as to the happenings after the first World War by the
'Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice,' which aroused the public concern of
Chief Justice Hughes (then at the bar), and by the little
book entitled 'The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty'
by Louis F. Post, who spoke with the authoritative knowledge
of an Assistant Secretary of Labor.'' (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, Harris v. United States (1947), 331 U.S. 145, 173
[67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399].)
Devotion to Americanism often calls for something other
than conformity. The plaintiff in the present case knew that
to protect the Constitution, indeed merely to invoke its protection for all Americans, required courage, and that hardihood to challenge a wrong done under color of authority was
as indispensable to good citizenship as would be, in other
circumstances, unquestioning obedience. President Thomas
Jefferson wrote to Benjamin Rush in a letter dated April 21,
1803: "It behooves every man who values liberty of con-
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science for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of
others; or their ease may, by change of circumstances, become
his own. l t behooves him, too, in his own case to give no
of concession, betraying the common right of independent opinion, by answering questions of faith which the
laws have left between God and himself." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the last analysis, when the moment of decision comes,
to the private citizen as well as to the judge, it is in the quiet
of his own mind and in the glow of his own courage that
Americanism thrives. And it is in the cumulative decision of
eitizeu as well as official, that Americanism is reborn
each moment.
Por the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22,
HJG7. Gibson, C .•J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the
opinioll that the petition should be granted.
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DANIEL PHINCE, Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF
SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Taxation-Exemptions-Veterans.-Const., art. XX, § 19, lim-

the n~tcrans' tax exemption to those otherwise entitled
who do not advocate the overthrow of federal or state government by force and violence or the support of a foreign
ftovernment in the event of hostilities against the United
States, and Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of
loyalty on claiming exemption from property tax, are valid;
such code section does not fallaciously infer that those who
do not subscribe to the oath engage in the prohibited activity.
[2] Statutes-Title and Subject Matter-Constitutional Provision.
--Const., art. XX, § 19, relating to subversive persons and
groups, does not violate Const., art. IV, § 24, declaring that
ewry act shall c>mbrace but one subject which shall be exprc>ssed in its titl<~, since article IV deals with the "Legislative
Departnwnt" and section 24 is intended to be and has been
limited to legislative enactments under the Constitution.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 93; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 546 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 79(2); [2] Statutes, § 38.

